Political Metals

Submitted by: Richard (Rick) Mills | Ahead of the Herd

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As a general rule, the most successful man in life is the man who has the best information

In World War I severe material shortages played havoc with production schedules and caused lengthy delays in implementing programs. This led to development of the Harbord List – a list of 42 materials deemed critical to the military.

After World War II the United States created the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) to acquire and store critical strategic materials for national defense purposes. The Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials (DLA Strategic Materials) oversees operations of the NDS and their primary mission is to “protect the nation against a dangerous and costly dependence upon foreign sources of supply for critical materials in times of national emergency.”

The NDS was intended for all essential civilian and military uses in times of emergencies. In 1992, Congress directed that the bulk of these stored commodities be sold. Revenues from the sales went to the Treasury General Fund and a variety of defense programs - the Foreign Military Sales program, military personnel benefits, and the buyback of broadband frequencies for military use.

American Silver Eagle

The American Silver Eagle is the official silver bullion coin of the United States. It was first released by the United States Mint on November 24, 1986 and is struck only in the one troy ounce size.

The Bullion American Silver Eagle sales program ultimately came about because the US government wanted, during the 1970s and early 1980s, to sell off what it considered excess silver from the Defense National Stockpile.

“Several administrations had sought unsuccessfully to sell silver from the stockpile, arguing that domestic production of silver far exceeds strategic needs. But mining-state interests had opposed any sale, as had pro-military legislators who wanted assurances that the proceeds would be used to buy materials more urgently needed for the stockpile rather than merely to reduce the federal deficit.” Wall Street Journal

The authorizing legislation for the American Silver Eagle bullion sales program required that the silver used for the coins had to be from the Defense National Stockpile. By 2002 the DNS stockpile was so depleted of silver that if the American Silver Eagle bullion sales program was to continue further legislation was required.

On June 6, 2002, Senator Harry Reid (D-Nevada) introduced the Support of American Eagle Silver Bullion Program Act to “authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver on the open market when the silver stockpile is depleted.”

2002 - 10,539,026 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold.

2003 - 8,495,008 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold, silver averaged $4.88 an ounce for the year.

2004 - 8,882,754 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold. For 2004 the average cost of an ounce of silver was $6.67.

2005 - 8,891,025 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold. Silver averaged $7.32 an ounce.

2006 - 10,676,522 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold. Silver averaged $11.55 an ounce

2007 - 9,028,036 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold.

2008 - 20,583,000 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold. Silver averaged $14.99 an ounce and almost 80% more Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold then in any previous year.

The US Mint suspended sales of the silver bullion coins to its network of authorized purchasers twice during the year.

In March 2008, sales increased nine times over the month before - 200,000 to 1,855,000.

In April 2008, the United States Mint had to start an allocation program, effectively rationing Silver Eagle bullion coins to authorized dealers on a weekly basis due to “unprecedented demand.”

On June 6, 2008, the Mint announced that all incoming silver planchets were being used to produce only bullion issues of the Silver Eagle and not proof or uncirculated collectible issues.

The 2008 Proof Silver Eagle became unavailable for purchase from the United States Mint in August 2008.

2009 - 30,459,000 Bullion American Silver Eagles were sold

On March 5, 2009, the United States Mint announced that the proof and uncirculated versions of the Silver Eagle coin for that year were temporarily suspended due to continuing high demand for the bullion version.

On October 6, 2009, the Mint announced that the collectible versions of the Silver Eagle coin would not be produced for 2009.

The sale of 2009 Silver Eagle bullion coins was suspended from November 24 to December 6 and the allocation program was re-instituted on December 7.

Silver Eagle bullion coins sold out on January 12, 2010.

The average cost of an ounce of silver in 2009 was $14.67

2010

No proof Silver Eagles were released through the first ten months of the year, and there was a complete cancellation of the uncirculated Silver Eagles.

Production of the 2010 Silver Eagle bullion coins began in January instead of  December as usual. The coins were distributed to authorized dealers under an allocation program until September 3.

In 2010 the US Mint sold 34,700,000 Bullion American Silver Eagle Coins.

2011

According to the USGS’s most recent Silver Mineral Industry Survey, silver production fell to 37 tonnes in October - compared to 53 tonnes year over year (yoy).

In 2011, the United States produced approximately 1,054 tonnes of silver – down from 2010’s production of 1,154 tonnes and down from 2007’s production of 1,163 tonnes.

The US imported 6,600,000 oz of silver for consumption in 2011 – up from 2007’s imports of 4,830,000 oz.

In 2011 the US Mint sold 39,868,500 Bullion American Silver Eagle Coins.

2011 was the first year in which official coin sales will surpass domestic silver production.

Jeff Clark of Casey Research writes“For the first time in history, sales of silver Eagle and Maple Leaf coins surpassed domestic production in both the US and Canada. Throw in the fact that by most estimates less than 5% of the US population owns any gold or silver and you can see how precarious the situation is. A supply squeeze is not out of the question – rather it is coming to look more and more likely with each passing month.”

The US Mint is required by law to mint the bullion Silver Eagles to meet public demand for precious metal coins as an investment option. The numismatic versions of the coin (proof and uncirculated) were added by the Mint solely for collectors.

2012

United States Mint Authorized Purchasers (AP’s) ordered 3,197,000 Bullion American Silver Eagle Coins on January 3rd, the first day they went on sale. That opening day total catapulted January Bullion Eagle sales higher than half of the monthly totals in 2011.

As of January 25th 2012, 5,547,000 Bullion American Silver Eagle Coins had been sold.

Bullion Silver Eagles are guaranteed for weight and purity by the government of the United States and because of this the US government allows bullion Silver Eagles to be added to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).

Conclusion

The twin policies of zero interest rates and the continual creation of money and credit being enacted today, by all governments and central banks, means that the purchase of precious metals is the only way to protect the value of your assets.

“Mark my words, if the interest rates on U.S. government debt truly reflected both the real level of inflation in this country and the rising risk of some form of default, rates would already by sky-high and the U.S. would resemble a massive Greece.”  John Embry, Chief Investment Strategist, Sprott Asset Management

Investors are currently risk adverse and mining stocks are not well understood by the general investing public, but at least one thing is going to become very apparent to most -  the best way to hedge yourself against inflation could be owning silver.

Junior resource companies offer the greatest leverage to increasing demand and rising prices for silver. Junior resource companies are soon going to have their turn under the investment spotlight and should be on every investors radar screen. Are they on yours?

If not, maybe they should be.

Richard (Rick) Mills
[email protected]
www.aheadoftheherd.com

Permanent Gold Backwardation
By Keith Weiner

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The Root of the Problem Is Debt

Worldwide, an incredible tower of debt has been under construction since President Nixon’s 1971 default on the gold obligations of the US government. His decree severed the redeemability of the dollar for gold and thus eliminated the extinguisher of debt. Debt has been growing exponentially everywhere since then. Debt is backed with debt, based on debt, dependent on debt and leveraged with yet more debt. For example, today it is possible to buy a bond (i.e., lend money) on margin (i.e., with borrowed money).

The time is now fast approaching when all debt will be defaulted on. In our perverse monetary system, one party’s debt is another’s “money.” A debtor’s default will impact the creditor (who is usually also a debtor to yet other creditors), causing him to default, and so on. When this begins in earnest, it will wipe out the banking system and thus everyone’s “money.” The paper currencies will not survive this. We are seeing the early edges of it now in the euro, and it’s anyone’s guess when it will happen in Japan, though it seems long overdue already. Last of all, it will come to the USA.

The purpose of this article is to present the early-warning signal and explain the actual mechanism to these events. Contrary to popular belief, it will not happen because the central banks increase the quantity of money to infinity. The money supply may even be contracting (which is what I expect).

To understand the terminal stages of the monetary system’s fatal disease, we must understand gold.

Defining Backwardation

First, let me introduce a key concept. Most traders define “backwardation” for a commodity as when the price of a futures contract is lower than the price of the same good in the spot market.

In every market, there are always two prices for a good: the bid and the ask. To sell a good, one must take the bid. And likewise, to buy the good, one must pay the ask. In backwardation, one can sell a physical good for cash and simultaneously buy a futures contract, and make a profit on the arbitrage. Note that in doing this trade, one’s position does not change in the end. One begins with a certain amount of the good and ends (upon maturity of the contract) with that same amount of the good.

Backwardation is when the bid in the spot market is greater than the ask in the futures market.

Many commodities, like wheat, are produced seasonally. But consumption is much more evenly spread around the year. Immediately prior to the harvest, the spot price of wheat is normally at its highest in relation to wheat futures. This is because wheat inventories in the warehouses are very low. People will have to pay a higher price for immediate delivery. At the same time, everyone in the market knows that the harvest is coming in one month. So the price, if a buyer can wait one month for delivery, is lower. This is a case of backwardation.

Backwardation is typically a signal of a shortage in a commodity. Anyone holding the commodity could make a risk-free profit by delivering it and getting it back later. If others put on this trade, and others, and so on, this would push down the bid in the spot market and lift up the ask in the futures market until the backwardation disappeared. The process of profiting from arbitrage compresses the spread one is arbitraging.

Actionable backwardations typically do not last long enough for the small trader to even see on the screen, much less trade. This is another way of saying that markets do not normally offer risk-free profits. In the case of wheat backwardation, for example, the backwardation may persist for weeks or longer. But there is no opportunity to profit for anyone, because no one has any wheat to spare. There is a genuine shortage of wheat before the harvest.

Why Gold Backwardation Is Important

Could backwardation happen with gold? Gold is not in shortage. One just has to measure abundance using the right metric. If you look at the inventories divided by annual mine production, the World Gold Council estimates this number to be around 80 years.

In all other commodities (except silver), inventories represent a few months of production. Other commodities can even have “gluts,” which usually lead to a price collapse. As an aside, this fact makes gold good for money. The price of gold does not decline, no matter how much of the stuff is produced. Production will certainly not lead to a “glut” in the gold market pulling prices downward.

So, what would a lower price on gold for future delivery mean compared to a higher price of gold in the spot market? By definition, it means that gold delivered to the market is in short supply.

The meaning of gold backwardation is that trust in future delivery is scarce.

In an ordinary commodity, scarcity of the physical good available for delivery today is resolved by higher prices. At a high enough price, demand for wheat falls until existing stocks are sufficient to meet the reduced demand.

But how is scarcity of trust resolved?

Thus far, the answer has been: via higher prices. Higher prices do coax some gold out of various hoards, jewelry, etc. Gold went into backwardation for the first time in December 2008. One could have earned a 2.5% (annualized) profit by selling physical gold and simultaneously buying a February 2009 future. Gold was $750 on December 5, but it rocketed to $920 - a gain of 23% - by the end of January.

But when backwardation becomes permanent, then trust in the gold futures market will have collapsed. Unlike with wheat, millions of people and many institutions have plenty of gold they can sell in the physical market and buy back via futures contracts. When they choose not to, that is the beginning of the end of the current financial system.

Why?

Think about the similarities between the following three statements:

• “My paper gold future contract will be honored by delivery of gold.”
• “If I trade my gold for paper now, I will be able to get gold back in the future.”
• “I will be able to exchange paper money for gold in the future.”

The reason why there was a significant backwardation (smaller backwardations have occurred intermittently since then) is that people did not believe the first statement. They did not trust that the gold future would be honored in gold.

And if they don’t believe that paper futures will be honored in gold, then they have no reason to believe that they can get gold in the future at all.

If some gold owners still trust the system at that point, then they can sell their gold (at much higher prices, probably). But sooner or later, there will not be any sellers of gold in the physical market.

Higher Prices Can’t Cure Permanent Gold Backwardation

With an ordinary commodity, there is a limit to what buyers are willing to pay based on the need satisfied by that commodity, the availability of substitutes and the buyers’ other needs that also must be satisfied within the same budget. The higher the price, the more holders and producers are motivated to sell, and the less consumers are motivated (or able) to buy. The cure for high prices is high prices.

But gold is different. Unlike wheat, gold is not bought for consumption. While some people hold it to speculate on increases in its paper price, these speculators will be replaced by others who hold it because it is money.

Once the gold owners have lost confidence, no amount of price change will bring back trust in paper currencies. Gold will not have a “high enough” price that will discourage buying or encourage selling. Thus gold backwardation will not only recur, but at some point, it will stay in its backwardated state.

In looking at the bid and ask, one other observation is germane to this discussion. In times of crisis, it is always the bid that is withdrawn - there is never a lack of asks. Permanent gold backwardation can be seen as the withdrawal of bids denominated in gold for irredeemable government debt paper (e.g., dollar bills).

Backwardation should not be able to happen at all as gold is so abundant. However, the fact that it has happened and keeps happening means that it is inevitable and that, at some point, backwardation will become permanent. The erosion of faith in paper money is a one-way process (with some zigs and zags). But eventually, backwardation will become deeper and deeper (while the dollar price of gold is rising, probably exponentially).

The final step is when gold completely withdraws its bid on paper. At that point, paper’s bid on gold will be unlimited, and this is why paper will inevitably collapse without gold.

Conclusion

Permanent gold backwardation leading to the withdrawal of the gold bid on the dollar is the inevitable result of the debt collapse. Governments and other borrowers have long since passed the point where they can amortize their debts. Now they merely “roll” the debt and the interest as they come due. This leaves them vulnerable to the market demand for their bonds. When they have an auction that fails to attract bids, the game will be over. Whether they formally default or whether they just print the currency to pay, it won’t matter.

Gold owners, like everyone else, will watch this happen. If government bond holders sell their securities in response to this crisis, they will only receive paper backed by that same government and its bonds. But the gold owner has the power to withdraw his bid on paper altogether. When that happens, there will be an irreconcilable schism between gold and paper, with real goods and services taking the side of gold. And in a process that should play out within a few months once it gets started, paper money will no longer have any value.

Gold is not officially recognized as the foundation of the financial system. Yet it is still a necessary component. When it is withdrawn, the worldwide regime of irredeemable paper money will collapse.

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In 2011, silver averaged a loss of 6.8% against 75 selected fiat currencies, while gold charted a corresponding gain of 14.3%. That occurred in a year when gold itself saw a plunge of 20% in USD terms from its high of $1920.

Was there any fundamental change in the silver market that could account for such a drastic plunge in silver prices? I know of none, and industry watchers concur.

Not once, but twice in 2011 did the silver market plunge by 35% in a matter of days on deliberate price moves lower. It is impossible for a world commodity to suddenly plunge 35% in days without some radical change in real supply and demand in a free market. Aside from proving that the silver market is still manipulated, these price plunges would not have occurred had the Commission acted expeditiously in concluding its current silver investigation - Ted Butler.

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Market manipulation. Price suppression. That’s why silver’s prices in all currencies did what they did in 2011. Ted Butler, in his most recent article “Enough is Enough” recounts the history of CFTC’s investigations into complaints of price suppression in the silver market.

The journey to justice and truth is often long and arduous, but must never be abandoned. The alternative is to live a life lacking substance. But neither should the journey be unnecessarily prolonged. These things tend to creep up on you day by day, but we have passed the point of the CFTC taking too long for deciding if the silver market has been manipulated in price. Enough time has passed.

Having started in August 2008, we are now at the 3.5 year mark in the current investigation into silver by the Enforcement Division of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Never has a similar investigation taken this long. Considering that the current silver investigation is the third such inquiry by the Commission into alleged downside price manipulation by large commercial participants on the COMEX, the agency has spent most of the past decade investigating silver. As recently as this past November, the Commission reaffirmed that the silver investigation is ongoing. Still, the issue is unresolved.

The current silver investigation began due to revelations I discovered and wrote about in the CFTC’s Bank Participation Report of August 2008. This report indicated one or two US commercial banks held a concentrated short position which was unprecedented and uneconomic in terms of real world supply and demand. I asked the question – how can one or two US banks holding a short position equal to 25% of annual world production not be manipulative? That question has not been answered by the Commission to this day. Later, I discovered that it was basically only one US bank, JPMorgan, which was the big COMEX silver short.

Not for a moment do I believe that the CFTC initiated the current silver investigation (or the previous two) just because I wrote a few articles. The key was that so many readers took it upon themselves to write to the Commission and their elected officials about the issues of concentration and manipulation in the silver market. Simply put, there would have been no silver investigations had not great numbers of you petitioned the regulators. Please think about that for a moment. It is beyond extraordinary that the agency has investigated and continues to investigate such a small market like silver. That can only be because of public pressure and that the evidence was compelling. Most remarkable of all is that the core allegation in all three silver investigations has remained the same – manipulative short selling by large commercial interests on the COMEX.

In the two prior investigations of May of 2004 and 2008, the Commission’s Division of Market Oversight (DMO) concluded that the silver market was not manipulated.

Particularly puzzling in the 2008 report was the contention by the DMO that the concentration on the short side in COMEX silver wasn’t unusually large and that the biggest short sellers regularly changed places, so that there wasn’t one big permanent short. The report was issued on May 13, 2008 or two months after JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns and its concentrated short position in COMEX silver. How the DMO could overlook the transfer of the most concentrated short position in the history of the commodity markets is beyond comprehension. Subsequently, I have come to believe that Bear Stearns’ forced acquisition was caused by the giant silver short position going against it (silver was at a 27-year price high at the time of the takeover) and not mortgage-related difficulties. In this article, I accused the DMO of lying.

Unlike the current silver investigation, the previous investigations were concluded by the Commission in months, not years. Timing aside, all three silver investigations share a commonality apart from stemming from the same basic core allegation of manipulative short selling. That commonality is the Commission’s refusal to conduct a fair and balanced investigation. I confess to being the instigator behind all three silver investigations (with you being the enabler). Not once, in any of these investigations has the agency ever contacted me or anyone I know who is familiar with the allegations. I even complained to the CFTC’s Inspector General about the one-sidedness of the process. How can you conduct a balanced investigation on manipulative short selling when you only question one side, the shorts?

The real problem with the findings of the CFTC of no manipulation in their previous investigations is two-fold. First, it provides a shield and comfort to the perpetrators of the manipulation in that they can continue to hide behind the agency’s findings in the furtherance of an active crime in progress. The longer the CFTC takes to act or report on its current investigation the comfort to the manipulators is maintained, at a cost to nearly everyone else. Second, the prior findings put the agency in a tricky spot. Because the Commission had previously found nothing amiss in the silver market on two separate occasions, if the agency uncovers any wrongdoing in silver in the current investigation it will, effectively, contradict its former findings. Obviously, it will be loath to do so.

The fact that the Commission will contradict its former findings should it now find something wrong in silver may explain the unprecedented delay on the part of the Enforcement Division to act. But the reluctance to reverse the former findings is a weak excuse for the Commission to fail in its most basic mission, namely, preventing fraud, abuse and manipulation. Most importantly, the silver manipulation is a crime in progress and the Commission’s delay in terminating it has allowed for untold continuing damage to thousands of market participants at the hands of the manipulators.

Full article at SilverSeek.com

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